How can the effects of the introduction of a new airline on a national airline network be measured? A time series approach for the Ryanair case in Spain by Castillo Manzano, José I. et al.
How Can the Eﬀects of the Introduction
of a New Airline on a National Airline
Network be Measured?
A Time Series Approach for the Ryanair Case in Spain
Jose´ I. Castillo-Manzano, Lourdes Lo´pez-Valpuesta,
and Diego J. Pedregal
Address for correspondence: Jose´ I. Castillo-Manzano, Facultad de Ciencias Econo´micas y Empres-
ariales, University of Seville, Avda. Ramo´n y Cajal, 1, 41018 Seville, Spain (jignacio@us.es).
Lourdes Lo´pez-Valpuesta is at Facultad de Ciencias Econo´micas y Empresariales, University of
Seville (Spain) (lolopez@us.es). Diego J. Pedregal is at Ingenium Research Group and IMACI,
University of Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) (diego.pedregal@uclm.es).
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the Fundacio´n Centro de Estudios Andaluces
for the ﬁnancial resources that it provided for this study. The authors are also grateful to Steven
A. Morrison, the anonymous reviewer, and Germa` Bel for their very helpful comments.
Abstract
This paper quantiﬁes the Ryanair Eﬀect on the Spanish airline network. It proposes newmethodology
based on an advanced time series approach that allows both the direct and indirect eﬀects of the
incorporation of a new airline to be measured and that can be easily extrapolated to other airport
systems. The ﬁndings show the mean indirect eﬀect on other airlines, in absolute value, is 8.6 per
cent of the total airport traﬃc, peaking at a maximum of almost 29 per cent. Also, surprisingly,
there is found to be a negative indirect eﬀect at only four of the ten airports analysed.
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1.0 Introduction
There is a wealth of literature illustrating the international development of the low-cost
model and its expansion into diﬀerent geographical areas (see Francis et al., 2006, for an
overview of this development). To be speciﬁc, in Europe, the early mid-1980s’ liberalisa-
tion between Ireland and the UK created the conditions that allowed the ﬁrst low-cost
airline to appear in Europe, Ryanair (see Francis et al., 2006, for the reasons that
favoured the creation of Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) in these two countries). This airline
has developed into the main low-cost European airline and the most successful LCC in
the world in terms of proﬁtability (Oliveira, 2008).
Ryanair followed in the footsteps of the Southwest Airlines company (see Guillen
and Lall, 2004, on the main diﬀerences between Ryanair and Southwest), although time
has shown that Ryanair has remained more faithful to the features of the original low-
cost model than its precursor, Southwest (Alamdari and Fagan, 2005). It has also
created a model that can be easily replicated (Guillen and Lall, 2004).
One of the salient features of the Ryanair management model for our analysis is the
use of underutilised secondary airports, often far from main city airports, and regional
airports. This is what diﬀerentiates the airline from other major LCCs like easyJet or
Southwest (Dobruszkes, 2006; Francis et al., 2006; Graham, 2009). Ryanair usually
avoids using primary airports, except when a secondary airport is not available in the
region (Graham, 2009), as the latter are less expensive in terms of landing charges; they
are less congested than the major hub airports; shorter turnarounds are possible and,
therefore, more journeys per day per plane can be achieved (Barrett, 2004).
Ryanair plays the dominant role in many of these secondary or regional airports and
in some, such as Charleroi and Girona (Barbot, 2006), almost exercises a monopoly.
This power inﬂuences its price strategy, as Ryanair seems to set lower fares when ﬂights
depart from or arrive at dominated airports (Barbot, 2006; Malighetti et al., 2009). This
is, in turn, inﬂuenced by the fact that operating at airports of this type allows Ryanair
always to be in a position to negotiate airport fees (Fro¨idh, 2008; Oliveira, 2008). In this
way Ryanair has shown that secondary airports are not only able to charge less (see
Castillo-Manzano, 2010) but also oﬀer subsidies to attract airlines (Papatheodorou and
Lei, 2006), often with the aid of local or regional public authorities (see Castillo-
Manzano and Lo´pez-Valpuesta, 2010).
Secondary airport managers where LCCs are found should be aware that they are
facing high volatility in their traﬃc, due both to the greater likelihood of bankruptcy or
merging of these kinds of airlines and to their dependence on the aid and subsidies that
they apply for. There is even higher volatility when the airport has a dominant single
LCC (Guillen and Lall, 2004; Barbot, 2006; Bel, 2009), as is the case of Ryanair at many
of the secondary airports where it operates.
In this context, the objective of this article is an analysis of what has been dubbed,
according to Guillen and Lall (2004), the Ryanair Eﬀect on the Spanish airline network.
Following Vowles (2001) and Pitﬁeld (2008) on the Southwest Eﬀect, the Ryanair Eﬀect
would be the eﬀect on average airfares, traﬃc volumes, and market shares experienced in
the markets into which Ryanair enters. The prior academic literature has studied the
impact of the arrival of a new LCC at the airports which accept them, mainly analysing
the eﬀect that this arrival has on airfares and the spillover eﬀects on nearby airports
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(Morrison, 2001; Vowles, 2001; Daraban and Fournier, 2008). With respect to the eﬀects
on traﬃc, most of the studies (Donzelli, 2010; Graham and Dennis, 2010) analyse the
impact of the arrival of an LCC by computing the overall growth in passenger numbers
without analysing any possible collateral eﬀects on the traﬃc of other companies.
This paper seeks to quantify the overall eﬀect on commercial traﬃc by responding to
the following question: given the evident increase that the arrival of Ryanair means for an
airport’s traﬃc which has been highlighted in the literature (Barrett, 2004; Francis et al.,
2004; York Aviation, 2007; Bel, 2009), how much of this growth can be directly attributed
to Ryanair’s own traﬃc, and what proportion can be attributed to the reaction of the
other airlines at the airport to the arrival of said low-cost airline? For the other companies,
the arrival of this low-cost company can have either a competitive or a catalyst eﬀect —
that is, be a stimulus that increases their volume of traﬃc — or it can have no eﬀect
whatsoever, or it can lead to a reduction in their traﬃc due to the substitution eﬀect.
As described previously, the ﬁrst eﬀect, the competitive or catalyst eﬀect, would be
attributable to Ryanair having become a leading company in the European aviation
sector. In some countries, like Spain, it is even the leading airline in passenger traﬃc. It
should therefore be anticipated that when a leading company breaks into new markets/
airports, it could raise the competitiveness of the other companies/airlines operating
there and, especially, point the way (pull or knock-on eﬀect) for others that were not
operating in this market (generally, a regional or previously underutilised secondary
airport) to follow them. With respect to increased competitiveness, this has been docu-
mented by Southwest. To be speciﬁc, according to Vowles (2001), the entry of Southwest
can in some cases lead to other carriers lowering their fares to remain competitive, which
stimulates more traﬃc. Gillen and Lall (2004) also state that fares fall prior to the arrival
of Southwest at a new destination and this generates tremendous demand which also
beneﬁts other carriers. With regard to the possible pull eﬀect, according to York
Aviation (2007), Ryanair acted as a catalyst to further growth at Eindhoven airport by
proving that low-fare services were sustainable, thus attracting new airlines. Generally,
this competitive eﬀect, in any of its forms, could also be supported by the increase in the
appeal of the airport from the perspective of transfers on the back of Ryanair’s new
destinations.
With regard to the above-described substitution eﬀect, this can in turn be one of two
types: First, the arrival of Ryanair with connections to the main European cities, like
London and Paris, can have an eﬀect on the connections that already exist between the
Spanish airports and destinations such as these which had previously been in the hands
of the network carriers (NCs). Second, the introduction of new point-to-point destina-
tions, especially in the case of regional airports, will reduce the number of ﬂights to hubs
like Madrid and Barcelona, which were previously an obligatory stopover point when
travelling to the new destinations. This possible negative point, namely the fall in NCs
traﬃc, has been condemned by Spanish travel agency associations protesting about non-
returnable subsidies and other economic aid being granted to Ryanair and other LCCs
by the public authorities (see Castillo-Manzano and Lo´pez-Valpuesta, 2010). According
to these associations, these substitution eﬀects are especially detrimental to conference
tourism (see Castillo-Manzano et al., 2011).
Both the total direct and indirect eﬀects of Ryanair need to be measured from the
point of view of transport policy for local and regional public administrations to assess
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the increasingly frequent and higher economic compensation that the company demands
to operate in regional airports both in Spain (see Castillo-Manzano et al., 2011) and in
the rest of Europe.
Methodologically, this study uses an econometric model to estimate the net quantita-
tive impact of the arrival of this airline on the main traﬃc at Spanish airports in line
with other studies (Pitﬁeld, 2007, 2008).
The major advantage of the proposed methodological approach is that it can be
easily extrapolated to other airport systems to measure the eﬀects that the arrival of any
new airline, be it an LCC or an NC, would have on the other airlines at the various
airports.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out the data and presents the
methodological approach. Section 3 presents the empirical results, while Section 4
includes the discussion of these ﬁndings and, ﬁnally, Section 5 presents the conclusions
of the study.
2.0 Data and Methods
The Spanish airports analysed in this study were chosen for having achieved Ryanair
traﬃc ﬁgures of over 400,000 passengers in 2008. Four of the ten airports in the sample
were in the list of the top ﬁfty busiest airports in Europe in 2008, speciﬁcally Madrid-
Barajas (fourth), Palma de Majorca (thirteenth), Ma´laga (thirty-second), and Alicante
(forty-ﬁrst). When we add the case of Barcelona (ninth), where Ryanair started operating
in the autumn of 2010, to these airports, it can be seen that, unlike in other countries,
Ryaniar operates at the major hubs in Spain, not only at secondary or regional airports.
This is due both to Spanish airport charges being low and to the fact that there are no
great diﬀerences between these charges at the various airports, whatever their size.1
The total eﬀect of Ryanair’s arrival on the above-mentioned airports to December
2008 will be split into a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect:
1 The direct eﬀect is the eﬀect that the literature has traditionally measured — that is, the
percentage represented by Ryanair traﬃc out of the total traﬃc at the airport (see
equation (1)). TRi;t ¼ Ryanair traﬃc at airport i during month t and TTi;t ¼ total
traﬃc at airport i in month t (see Figure 1). Finally, l is the month that Ryanair
began to operate at airport i and N is the number of observations:
DEi ¼
PN
t¼ l
TRi;t
PN
t¼ l
TTi;t
100: ð1Þ
1For example, the airport charge for domestic and European Union ﬂights at Barcelona airport’s spectacular new
terminal was €6.12 per tonne (10–100 tonne aircraft), while at Barcelona’s secondary and most distant airports,
Reus and Girona, the charge stood at €5.55 — that is, only 10 per cent less. Nevertheless, new charges have come
into force in 2011 with greater discrimination according to airport size.
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2 The indirect eﬀect, often ignored by previous studies, will comprise two entries, which
will be aggregated for their estimation. These entries are the competitive or catalyst
eﬀect on other airlines, with a positive sign, and the substitution eﬀect on other airlines
— NCs in the main — with a negative sign. The substitution eﬀect can be caused both
by Ryanair oﬀering connections which had previously been oﬀered by other airlines
and also by the company’s new destinations, which reduce traﬃc to national hubs
like Madrid and Barcelona. The data used to measure the indirect eﬀects of Ryanair
on airport i can be divided into three groups:
(A) The endogenous variables will be the monthly air traﬃc, without considering
Ryanair traﬃc, at the ten Spanish airports included in the study; this is residual
traﬃc. The available time series spans from January 1996 to December 2008
are taken from AENA yearbooks (source: www.aena.es).
(B) The exogenous variables, separated into two groups, are as follows:
(B.1) Dummy exogenous variables: a wide range of variables are included in
models to estimate a number of intervention variables and outlier eﬀects
seen in the data. The most important, with their deﬁnitions, are as
follows:
Figure 1
Millions of Air Passengers (Per Month) at the Ten Spanish Airports Considered
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(B.1.1) Easter: Air traﬃc around this holiday period is especially intense
in Spain. Indeed, it is considered to be high season for tourists,
among other reasons due to the numerous celebrations of the
passion of Christ. Accordingly, the moveable feast of Easter
variable is deﬁned by assigning diﬀerent weights to the days in
question depending on the expected traﬃc density at Spanish
airports (these weights have to add up to one). Maximum weights
are assigned to Wednesday, Thursday, Easter Sunday, and
Monday. Weights of zero are assigned to the rest of the days.
(B.1.2) Business: Monthly time series that are totals of daily activities
can be inﬂuenced by each calendar month’s weekday and
weekend composition. This variable is introduced to take into
account the diﬀerences among months regarding the propor-
tion of weekdays with respect to weekends. It is constructed as
the number of business or trading days with respect to weekend
days and holidays in each individual month — that is, the
number of business or trading days minus the number of
Saturdays and Sundays multiplied by 5/2. Extra holidays in
each month are subtracted from the business days.
(B.1.3) Leap: Addresses the leap year eﬀect. The value is 1 when
February contains 29 days, and 0 otherwise.
(B.1.4) 9/11: The negative eﬀect on air traﬃc that resulted from the
9/11 terrorist attacks which, as found in earlier studies (Inglada
and Rey, 2004), also had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the Spanish
airport system. The duration of these eﬀects in number of
months has been determined empirically by estimating succes-
sively models in which this eﬀect have increasing durations from
one to six years and choosing the model with the best ﬁt.
(B.1.5) There are other outliers, often related to bad weather condi-
tions, covert strikes by air-traﬃc controllers, or even the
opening of new air terminals like Terminal T4 at Madrid-
Barajas airport (LST4). These have all been detected by statis-
tical tools. The procedure to search for such outliers consists of
selecting the residuals outside four times standard deviation
and including them as potential candidates in the models under
diﬀerent speciﬁcations (see the methodological section below).
The outliers are included in ﬁnal models with the speciﬁcation
that provides the best ﬁt when they are statistically signiﬁcant.
(B.2) Economic activity: The literature argues that economic activity is closely
linked to air traﬃc as a result of which it is generally included as an
indicator when modelling air traﬃc (see Inglada and Rey, 2004). In this
article, economic activity is represented using a Spanish Ministry of the
Economy and Treasury synthetic economic activity index (source:
http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/dgpe/default.aspx).
(C) The Ryanair indirect eﬀect: This eﬀect has been split into two terms for testing:
(i) one constant for the periods when Ryanair was operating at each airport,
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measuring the shock it produces (called ‘Ryan Shock’ afterwards); and (ii) mean
corrected Ryanair traﬃc, measuring how the dynamics of Ryanair traﬃc aﬀect
the overall dynamics at a given airport and any possible lags for this variable
(‘Ryan Dynamic’). There were four cases (Girona, Reus, Murcia, and Santander)
where the previous procedure had to be reﬁned in order to ﬁnd appropriate
models. Ryanair has a dominant position at these four airports that would explain
the structural changes that have been detected after Ryanair commenced opera-
tions, resulting in the need for special treatment in these cases (see details below).
The time series models employed in the analysis are in the class of discrete time linear
Transfer Function models (see Castillo-Manzano et al., 2010, for an analysis of the
advantages of this methodology on transportation research studies). The general formu-
lation may be expressed as in equation (2):
yi;t ¼
Xh
j¼ 1
oni; j Bð Þ
dmi; j Bð Þ
ui; j;t þNi Bð Þei;t; ð2Þ
where yi;t are the air passenger total data for the ith airport excluding the Ryanair
passengers; ui; j;t are the inputs on which the output data depend (most of them deter-
ministic, with the sole exceptions of the economic cycle and part of the Ryanair indirect
eﬀect, see the list above); ei;t is a zero mean and constant variance Gaussian white noise;
oni; j ðBÞ ¼ ðoi;0 þ oi;1Bþ    þ oni; j Bni; j Þ ð j ¼ 1; . . . ; hÞ are polynomials in the backshift
operator (that is, Bkyt ¼ yt k) that may have leading zero coeﬃcients when a pure
time delay is necessary; and dmi; j ðBÞ ¼ ð1þ di;1Bþ    þ dmi; j Bmi; j Þ ð j ¼ 1; . . . ; hÞ are
stationary or stable polynomials.
It is important to include a speciﬁc comment on the Ryanair input variables intro-
duced in equation (2). Broadly speaking, the input variables linked to the Ryanair
indirect eﬀect are: (i) ‘Ryan Shock’: one step variables with zeros before Ryanair
commenced operation, and ones after the company had commenced operation; and (ii)
‘Ryan Dynamic’: Ryanair traﬃc minus its mean level during the period of operation.
However, although this would be the general way that the airports are treated, there are
four airports that behave in a special way given the dominant role played by Ryanair in
their traﬃc. These are the aforementioned cases of Girona, Reus, Murcia, and
Santander. As such, the standard method used for handling the Ryanair indirect eﬀect
by dividing it into ‘Ryan Shock’ and ‘Ryan Dynamic’, as in the cases shown in Table 1,
was inadequate for these four airports. By way of example, Figure 2 shows the special
case of Girona and compares variable yi;t (that is, the total number of passengers
excluding Ryanair) with Ryanair traﬃc at Girona airport (where Ryanair commenced
operations in December 2002).
It is clear that the total eﬀect of Ryanair is enormous in this case, since, to put it in
simple terms, Ryanair traﬃc is greater than all the other ﬂights together and is on the
increase. The importance of Ryanair at Girona even aﬀects the dynamics of the traﬃc
there as, after Ryanair started to operate in Girona, the tendency that was seen was for
numbers of non-Ryanair passengers to decrease during summer (peaks), while they
tended to increase during winter (troughs). This suggests that Ryanair ﬂights have
diﬀerent and opposing eﬀects in winter and in summer (although it will be shown below
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that the summer eﬀect is in fact insigniﬁcant, since it would seem that the summer
declines had started before Ryanair commenced operations at the airport — see Table 2).
For this reason, winter and summer are estimated as separate eﬀects in the model (see
new variables Sum## and Win## in Table 2, where ‘##’ stands for the last two digits of
the year).
Traﬃc at Reus airport was seen to follow a similar behaviour, perhaps due to the
fact that before Ryanair arrived at these airports, both were only used during the
summer season (mainly as operating bases for charter ﬂights to the Catalonian coast).
Similarly, the regional airports in Murcia and Santander also have to address
Ryanair’s dominant position, as a result of which the Ryanair indirect eﬀect has had to
be adapted to the structural changes produced by the company after its arrival. Speciﬁ-
cally, the Ryanair indirect eﬀect at both of these airports was divided into several
empirically identiﬁed steps (see Table 2, fourth column, third row). Speciﬁcally, for
Murcia airport three diﬀerent steps were found (February 2005 to February 2007,
March 2007 to October 2007, and November 2007 onwards), while at Santander airport,
only two steps were needed (March 2005 to February 2007 and March 2007 onwards).
To summarise, the Ryanair indirect eﬀect (Hi;t) would be the addition of the Transfer
Function terms in (2) that have links with the Ryanair variables. In most cases it will be
just two terms, the shock and the dynamic eﬀects (‘Ryan Shock’ and ‘Ryan Dynamic’ as
deﬁned above and shown in Table 1), that is:
Hi;t ¼
Xn
j 2Ryanair
oni; j Bð Þ
dmi; j Bð Þ
ui; j;t: ð3Þ
The general representation of the noise model Ni Bð Þei;t in (2) is an ARIMA pi; di; qið Þ
Pi;Di;Qið Þ12 formulation shown in equation (4):
Ni Bð Þei;t ¼
1
1 Bð Þdi 1 B12ð ÞDi
#qi Bð Þ
fpi Bð Þ
Qi B
12
 
Pi B
12ð Þ ei;t: ð4Þ
Figure 2
Million Passengers (Per Month) at Girona Airport
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Here 1 Bð Þ and 1 B12  are diﬀerencing operators necessary to reduce the time
series to mean stationarity; fpi Bð Þ ¼ 1þ fi;1Bþ fi;2B2 þ    þ fi;piBpi
 
and Pi B
12
  ¼
1þ i;1B12 þ i;2B24 þ    þ PiB12Pi
 
are stationary polynomials in the backshift
operator; #qi Bð Þ ¼ 1þ #i;1Bþ #i;2B2 þ    þ #i;qiBqi
 
and Qi B
12
  ¼ 1þi;1B12þ
i;2B
24 þ    þQiB12QiÞ are invertible polynomials.
The identiﬁcation of order models for the ARIMA part (3) was done by means of the
Simple and Partial Autocorrelation Functions (ACF and PACF, see Box et al., 1994). The
Transfer Function orders in equation (2) were identiﬁed by selecting the models that mini-
mised the Schwarz Information Criterion. Estimation was carried out by Exact Maximum
Likelihood in MATLAB, with the help of the ECOTOOL toolbox (Pedregal et al., 2012).
Table 2
Estimation Results for Univariate Models with Intervention Variables
Girona Reus Murcia Santander
Easter
Business
Leap
9/11
Cycle
2.047/(10.651B)
1.874
0.511
0.335
0.349
(6)
2.274
Easter
Business
Leap
11S
Cycle
0.057
0.006
3.793
0.004
0.063
(25)
2.382B
Ryan Sum04
Ryan Sum05
Ryan Sum06
Ryan Sum07
Ryan Sum08
Ryan Win03
Ryan Win04
Ryan Win05
Ryan Win06
Ryan Win07
Ryan Win08
Ryan Win09
Ryan Dynamic
0.327
0.727
0.772
1.086
1.173
1.744
1.082
0.473
0.877
1.257
1.416
1.334
0.942
0.292
0.561
1.428
1.137
0.782
LS05FEB–07FEB
LS07MAR–07OCT
LS07NOV
LS05MAR–07FEB
LS07MAR
0.259
0.410
0.362
0.166
0.297
AO99NOV
AO00MAR
1.019
0.928
AO99DEC
AO02AUG
0.191
0.180
MA1
MA12
AR1
AR12
0.484
0.292
0.706
MA1
MA12
AR1
AR12
0.509
0.847
0.471
0.334
s2 87.41 52.428 s2 11.041 4.831
Q(12)
Q(24)
Bera-Jarque
6.913
23.748
2.867
(0.238)
10.464
18.418
6.112
(0.047)
Q(12)
Q(24)
Bera-Jarque
8.381
20.471
2.642
(0.267)
12.750
28.548
0.920
(0.631)
Note: Signiﬁcant at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. s2 stands for the
innovations variance; Q(12) are the Ljung–Box Q statistics for 12, respectively; Bera-Jarque is a normality
test (P-values in brackets);H is a variance ratio homoscedasticity test (P-values in brackets). The number of
months that the 9/11 eﬀect lasted is given in brackets after the coeﬃcient for the variable.
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One important part of this study was the treatment of outlier observations. For this,
automatic detection algorithms were used, also implemented in ECOTOOL (Pedregal
et al., 2012). The type of outliers that were detected on the endogenous variables in this
paper are of two types: a sudden change positive or negative known as an Additive
Outlier (coded later on as AO) and a sudden change that persists in time, known as a
Level Shift (LS).
Finally, the total eﬀect for airport i will be obtained by aggregating the direct and
indirect eﬀects at said airport according to the following expression:
TEi ¼
XN
l
ðTRi;t þHi;tÞ
XN
l
TTi;t
¼
XN
l
TRi;t
XN
l
TTi;t
þ
XN
l
Hi;t
XN
l
TTi;t
¼ DEi þ IEi ; ð5Þ
where Hi;t is the measurement of the indirect eﬀect — that is, the eﬀects caused by
Ryanair on the traﬃc of the other airlines generally measured by the two types of vari-
able described above, which in the standard form will be:
Hi;t ¼
X
k
g^ke
from l to N
lþ k 1 þ
X
kþ h
g^kþ hTRlþ h 1: ð6Þ
To summarise, as IEi,t can be either positive or negative, the total eﬀect can be
greater or smaller than, or equal to, the direct eﬀect. It will always be equal when the
estimations of the coeﬃcients that measure the Ryanair indirect eﬀect are not signiﬁcant.
It will be greater (smaller) when the Ryanair competitive or catalyst eﬀects are higher
(lower) than the substitution eﬀect on the NCs.
3.0 Results
Ten models have been estimated with the diﬀerent explanatory variables. Tables 1 and 2
show the estimated parameters of the intervention variables for each equation in the ten
models. Both tables have the same format:
(i) the input variables in the ﬁrst block are dummy variables dealing with moveable
festivals, the 9/11 eﬀect and the economic cycle eﬀect;
(ii) the second block concentrates on the Ryanair indirect eﬀect, divided as corresponds
for each airport;
(iii) the third block contains a set of dummy variables whose names indicate the type of
outlier (two letters), the year (two digits), and the month (last three letters);
(iv) the fourth block corresponds to the parameters of the ARIMA part of the model; and
(v) the ﬁnal block includes additional tests of residuals in order to check model
appropriateness.
As was explained in the previous section, Table 1 shows the standard estimations
for airports where Ryanair is not the dominant airline. Meanwhile, Table 2 gives
individualised estimations at airports which had marginal traﬃc before the arrival of
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Ryanair but where this company now has a dominant position, bordering on a monopoly
in some.
Finally, Table 3 presents the diﬀerent eﬀects for each of the airports included in the
study. These are the mean eﬀects during the period analysed from the arrival of Ryanair
to the end of 2008. Obviously, the intensity of these eﬀects varies over time, depending
on how traﬃc varies.
4.0 Discussion
When taken as a whole, the results presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3 provide a clear view
of the eﬀects caused by Ryanair on the Spanish airport system, both at international
hubs (Madrid), regional hubs (Palma de Majorca, Ma´laga, and Alicante), secondary
airports (Reus and Girona), and regional airports (Seville, Valencia, Murcia, and
Santander). In general terms, the total eﬀect can be seen to be signiﬁcantly positive with the
sole exception of Ma´laga, where it is insigniﬁcant. However, the diﬀerent size of the total
eﬀect, from 0 per cent to 83 per cent, provides a set of relatively heterogeneous case studies.
With regard to the indirect eﬀects, what is striking is the high mean value with an
absolute value of 8.6 per cent. Moreover, they are positive at most of the airports, at six
to be speciﬁc, which means that the competitive or catalyst eﬀects of Ryanair pre-
dominate over other companies, primarily over those with a similar business model —
that is, LCCs — rather than the substitution eﬀects on NCs.
The case of Madrid merits special mention. It is one of the few international hubs at
which Ryanair operates in continental Europe. Ryanair’s arrival at the airport in
November 2006, and its recent establishment in Barcelona, in September 2010, is due in
the main part to the low airport fees charged compared to other European airports of a
similar size, which makes these hubs compatible with the LCC management model. Said
low charges could not be justiﬁed in these airports’ accounts — both are currently
running at a loss — so we may be talking of covert subsidies to air transportation which
Table 3
Total, Direct, and Indirect Eﬀects of the Arrival of Ryanair on the Ten Airports Analysed
Direct eﬀect (%) Indirect eﬀect (%) Total eﬀect (%)
Madrid-Barajas
Alicante
Valencia
Ma´laga
Palma de Majorca
Seville
Girona
Reus
Murcia
Santander
2.6
9.8
15.2
1.7
1.8
8.6
86.0
43.1
43.7
46.1
6.2
2.8
11.5
1.5
0.2
6.7
3.1
28.8
15.1
10.5
8.8
6.9
26.7
0.2
2.0
15.3
82.9
14.4
58.8
56.6
Mean of absolute values
Standard deviation
25.9
27.9
8.6
8.5
27.3
28.6
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favour, among other things, one of the country’s main strategic sectors, tourism (Spain
is currently one of the premier tourism destinations in the world).2
What is true is that when presented with this new business opportunity of operating
at intercontinental hubs, Ryanair has responded with an even more aggressive strategy,
setting up multiple routes in a short space of time. In Madrid, for example, almost four
years after beginning to operate there, the company operates forty-four routes, whereas
in Barcelona, only one month after initiating operations, it has already programmed
twenty-three diﬀerent routes. The Madrid results show that this strategy is mutually
beneﬁcial; for the airport also as it gains an indirect eﬀect which is almost two and a half
times that of the direct eﬀect, 6.2 per cent of all airport traﬃc, to be speciﬁc. This new
commitment to LCCs therefore translates into a signiﬁcant percentage of traﬃc in an
adverse economic environment. Thus, if we compare the total traﬃc share for all LCCs
at Madrid airport during the quarter prior to Ryanair’s introduction with the same
quarter two years later, an increase can be seen from 5.6 per cent to 10.2 per cent
without Ryanair traﬃc being considered, rising to 13.5 per cent when Ryanair is
considered. Speciﬁcally, the other LCCs experienced an 84.2 per cent increase in their
traﬃc during those two years, while the NCs and charter airlines saw an average fall in
traﬃc of 4 per cent.
One collateral eﬀect of this new strategy of operating at hubs will be seen at the
airports at Reus and Girona in the short term. To date these have played the role of
secondary airports to Barcelona and, according to the ﬁndings of this study, can be seen
to have an overwhelming dependence on Ryanair. Furthermore, the commitment to
Ryanair, supported by not insubstantial subsidies (see Bel, 2009, for the case of Girona),
seems to have resulted in incompatibilities with other airlines, and these airports are the
two that present the highest negative indirect eﬀects, which indicates the extent to which
they have depleted their potential for growth with other airlines. Be that as it may, a
distinction must be made between Reus’ 28.8 per cent and Girona’s 3.1 per cent. The
lesser negative eﬀect at the latter of the two airports may be due to the large number of
new routes that Ryanair has set up in Girona, sixty-four compared to twenty-eight in
Reus. This makes Girona much more attractive as an airport where stopovers can be
made en route to other Spanish and European airports.
Even so, it does not seem possible to extrapolate the conclusions for Madrid airport
to other regional hubs which specialise in sun-and-sand tourism, with their associated
charter ﬂights — that is, Ma´laga, Alicante, and Palma de Majorca (8.9 per cent, 11.3 per
cent, and 20.6 per cent, respectively, of charter ﬂight passengers on average in 2008). At
these airports the indirect eﬀect turns into a substitution eﬀect, and not a multiplying
eﬀect, as is the case in Alicante and Ma´laga, or is simply insigniﬁcant, as is the case in
Palma de Majorca. Therefore, the Ryanair total eﬀect at best is limited to its own traﬃc
(Palma de Majorca) or, in the worst case scenario — Ma´laga — is not signiﬁcant.
Finally, in the last group, the regional airports, a distinction must be made between
those that enjoyed a signiﬁcant amount of traﬃc before the arrival of Ryanair, such as
2According to the UNWTO (2009), France is the ﬁrst country considering the number of tourist arrivals, followed
by the United States and Spain. According to international tourism revenues, the same three countries are in the
ﬁrst three places, but with the United States in ﬁrst place, Spain in second, and France in third place.
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Valencia and Seville, and those that were completely underutilised infrastructures, such
as Murcia and Santander (Francis et al., 2004, cite the existence of approximately 200
airports in Europe that can be classed as underutilised). In both categories the eﬀects are
entirely positive although the dependence is much greater in the second case, where
Ryanair is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for a percentage of total traﬃc
approaching 60 per cent.
In other respects, the proportionality that exists between the direct and indirect
eﬀects in Seville and Valencia is striking, speciﬁcally 78 per cent and 76 per cent, respec-
tively. Furthermore, in both cases the indirect eﬀect allows the corresponding direct
eﬀect to be multiplied, basically with the arrival of other low-cost airlines.
Thanks to the additional variables used, other results can be drawn that complement
the ﬁndings of the study. For example, the eﬀect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was felt
much more at urban airports like Madrid (twenty), Seville (twenty-eight), or Santander
(twenty-ﬁve) than at sun-and-sand related airports with charter ﬂights like Alicante
(thirteen) and Reus (six).
5.0 Conclusions
The primary objective of this paper is to provide and test an advanced time series
approach that allows both the direct and indirect eﬀects of the incorporation of a new
airline at an airport or in an airport system to be measured. This approach is suﬃciently
ﬂexible for it to be adapted to any case as long as suﬃciently broad time series are
available, which is relatively easy in air transport.
This methodological proposal has been tested for a speciﬁc case, the incorporation of
Ryanair into the Spanish airport system. The relevance of this case study is justiﬁed both
by the signiﬁcance of the airline itself, Ryanair, and by the transport policy debate that
the company’s arrival tends to bring with it. Speciﬁcally, an instrument is oﬀered that
uses the basis of results at similar airports to provide help to local and regional adminis-
trations in the hinterland of any given airport to take clear decisions on whether to
submit to the airline’s initial economic demands. Also, at a later date, it allows the eﬀects
on the airport itself to be estimated and so to judge whether maintaining these subsidies
over time is proﬁtable, as the airline also demands.
This debate needs to be clariﬁed if the ever greater amounts in the form of subsidies
demanded by the airline are taken into account. According to estimations by the Air
France–KLM air group, cited in the French newspaper, Le Figaro,3 Ryanair receives in
all of Europe 660 million euros in subsidies annually, the equivalent of 11 euros per
passenger (speciﬁcally at the Catalonian airports of Girona, Reus, and especially Lleida,
Ryanair receives over 8.5 million euros per year from public and private subsidies).4
Compared to earlier studies that only stress the growth that has occurred in the
overall traﬃc at an airport after the arrival of an LCC, the need for this more complex
3See www.leﬁgaro.fr/societes/2010/03/11/04015-20100311ARTFIG00389-air-france-veut-porter-plainte-contre-
ryanair-.php.
4See www.elpais.com/articulo/cataluna/milagro/amenaza/elpepiespcat/20100823elpcat_7/Tes.
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focus, which splits the growth into direct and indirect eﬀects, is evident due to the size of
the latter. Speciﬁcally, the mean indirect eﬀect, in absolute value, is 8.6 per cent of the
total airport traﬃc, peaking at a maximum of almost 29 per cent. The fact that the
indirect eﬀect is only negative at four of the ten airports analysed might also be an indi-
cation of a degree of overvaluation of the substitution eﬀects that Ryanair, in theory,
has on other airlines. So, although there is clear evidence that these eﬀects might occur
on occasion both at Spanish airports and in other countries (see, for example, Pitﬁeld,
2007), this cannot be used as a general argument by Spanish travel agency associations
against Ryanair (see Castillo-Manzano et al., 2011). Conversely, at ﬁve of the airports
analysed, clear competitive or catalyst eﬀects seem to exist for the other airlines.
Two cases have been diﬀerentiated between the methodological proposal. First, for
the majority of the airports where the arriving airline has a signiﬁcant but not dominant
(in our case, up to 15 per cent) mean weight (direct eﬀect), the measurement of the
indirect eﬀects can be taken using a standard procedure based on two terms. Speciﬁcally,
a constant from the incorporation of the new airline and another variable and its
possible lags have been used (and could be used for other cases) that record the eﬀects of
the arriving airline’s dynamic over other traﬃc.
The results of this, when applied to the Spanish airport system, show that the
majority of the airports, especially in urban areas not specialised in sun-and-sand
tourism charter ﬂights,5 have beneﬁted from some positive eﬀects of Ryanair beyond
said company’s own traﬃc, especially at airports that were greatly underutilised before
the arrival of the airline.
Although a focus was chosen in which the results are measured with relative values
as percentages of total traﬃc type, the diﬀerent scales of the airports should not be
forgotten. As such, the 6.2 per cent indirect eﬀect at Madrid-Barajas, despite not being
among the highest values and even somewhat under the average (8.6 per cent), is
especially relevant. This 6.2 per cent implies that after the arrival of Ryanair, and during
the following 14 months, said airline would be indirectly responsible for almost 7 million
passengers. This result is clear empirical proof of the viability of the low-cost model at
large intercontinental hubs as long as they have excess leisure capacity, as did Madrid-
Barajas in this case, after the opening of terminal T4, and as long as the airport charges
are not high.
Second, at airports where Ryanair is in a dominant position with a market share or
direct eﬀect of over 40 per cent, a more individualised focus that takes into account the
profound changes that such huge dependence might have on the overall traﬃc structure
at these airports was opted for. In this regard, estimations justiﬁed by a prior automatic
outlier detection process have been made at Reus and Girona airports, which are used
by Ryanair as secondary airports for Barcelona, of the diﬀerentiated eﬀects that Ryanair
has caused on the traﬃc during the winter and summer seasons since the airline’s arrival
there. Broadly speaking, the eﬀects on the summers have been negative and on the
winters, positive. This could be explained by the fact that before Ryanair’s arrival, both
airports were underutilised, and were basically used in summer as operational bases for
5The negative inﬂuence of Ryanair and of LCCs in general on the traditional charter markets has been studied in
Williams et al. (2001) and Vera and Ivars (2009).
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charter ﬂights to the Catalonian coast (83.7 per cent of ﬂights at Girona and 92.2 per
cent at Reus were charter ﬂights in 2002, before the arrival of Ryanair at Girona in
December of that same year).
The large negative indirect eﬀect at Reus of almost 29 per cent must be highlighted.
This is a clear example of the incompatibility of the Ryanair model with other airlines
which, therefore, increases the dependence of the receiving airport on said company.
This result is especially relevant if it is taken into account that Ryanair has commenced
operations at Barcelona, which raises serious questions about the future of traﬃc at
Girona and Reus.6
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